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Abstract
Machery (Doing without concepts, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009) and 
Weiskopf (Synthese 169:145–173, 2009) argue that the kind concept is a natural 
kind if and only if it plays an explanatory role in cognitive scientific explanations. In 
this paper, we argue against this explanationist approach to determining the natural 
kind-hood of concept. We first demonstrate that hybrid, pluralist, and eliminativist 
theories of concepts afford the kind concept different explanatory roles. Then, we 
argue that we cannot decide between hybrid, pluralist, and eliminativist theories of 
concepts, because each endorses a different, but equally viable, specification of the 
explananda of cognitive science. It follows that an explanationist approach to deter-
mining the natural kind-hood of concept fails, because there is no consensus about 
whether or not concept should be afforded an explanatory role in our best cognitive 
scientific explanations. We conclude by considering what our critique of explana-
tionism could imply for further discussions about the explanatory role of concepts in 
cognitive science.
1  The Explanatory Challenge to concept
According to the “received view,” all concepts have a number of properties in 
common: they all store a single kind of information, they all have the same func-
tional properties, and they are all acquired by the same type of learning process, 
etc. (Machery and Seppälä 2011, p.  99). On this view, a theory of concepts aims 
to describe these properties and so to account for the formation and application 
of concepts. Moreover, from the perspective of the received view, concepts are of 
one kind—the kind concept—and they “explain the properties of our higher cogni-
tive competences”; that is, the properties of higher cognition that are operative in 
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cognitive tasks such as categorisation, meaning extraction, and inductive and deduc-
tive reasoning (Machery and Seppälä 2011, p. 99).1
In recent years, however, psychologists have identified several distinct types of 
categorisation judgements, several distinct operations of meaning extraction, and 
several distinct episodes of inductive/deductive reasoning, and so have been forced 
to posit a number of different representational kinds, with incommensurable proper-
ties, to do the required explanatory work. For example, prototypes (Rosch 1973; 
Lakoff 1987), bundles of exemplars (Nosofsky 1988), theory-like structures 
(Carey 1985; Gopnik and Meltzoff 1997; Rehder 2003), perceptual ‘proxytypes’ 
(Prinz 2002), and unstructured atomic symbols (Fodor 1994) have all been posited 
to explain, say, categorisation and reasoning. As a result, it has been argued that the 
received view of concepts cannot be correct, because the explanatory work is not 
done by the single kind concept, but by a set of representational kinds that do not 
store the same kinds of information or have the same functional properties (Bloch-
Mullins 2018).
To make the explanatory challenge to the received view concrete, consider expla-
nations of categorisation judgements. In some cases, psychologists explain the cat-
egorisation of an individual c in a category C in terms of a correspondence between 
the properties of c and the typical properties of members of C. In cases such as 
these, psychologists posit the kind prototype to do the required explanatory work. 
However, in other cases psychologists explain the categorisation of an individual c 
in a category C in terms of a judgement that c is sufficiently similar to salient mem-
bers of C. In cases such as these, psychologists posit the kind exemplar to do the 
required explanatory work. According to the explanatory challenge, because psy-
chologists are required to posit different representational kinds with different prop-
erties and functions to explain these different types of categorisation judgements, 
the kind concept is redundant in explanations of categorisation. And because the 
received view of concept fails to predict this explanatory diversity it is argued that it 
cannot be correct (cf. Machery and Seppälä 2011, p. 99).2
In this paper, we argue against one possible interpretation of the explanatory 
challenge: that the explanatory challenge demonstrates that concept is not a natural 
kind. This involves rejecting what we will call an explanationist approach for deter-
mining the natural kind-hood of concept, whereby concept is taken to be a natu-
ral kind iff concept features in a proposition best explaining some explananda of 
1 In this paper, we denote kinds with small caps.
2 One quick and easy way to respond to the explanatory challenge to the received view is to argue that 
all posited representational kinds are of the super-kind concept in virtue of the fact that they are all con-
stituents of thought. According to this response, all of the representational kinds posited to do explana-
tory work in cognitive science fall under the concept of concept in virtue of being conceptual in kind 
(Weiskopf 2009, pp. 147–148). Many philosophers have been quick to accept this view as part of their 
response to the explanatory challenge. However, even if one thinks that this response is broadly correct, 
this still leaves open a further question: what are the defining properties of the super-kind concept that 
make it the case that all representations doing explanatory work in cognitive science can be classified as 
concepts? Providing an answer to this question has proven to be controversial and remains the central 
issue of contention between competing theories of concepts that we discuss in sections three, four, and 
five below.
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cognitive science. For example, according to an explanationist approach for deter-
mining the natural kind-hood of concept, if concept features in a proposition best 
explaining some aspects of categorisation—e.g., ‘categorisation judgements involve 
the comparison of some individual c with some concept C’—, then concept is a 
natural kind.
Our argument against this explanationist approach to determining the natural 
kind-hood of concept runs as follows. In Sect.  2, we introduce the explanationist 
approach to determining whether or not concept is a natural kind. In Sects. 3 and 4, 
we introduce eliminativist, pluralist, and hybrid theories of concepts, and demon-
strate that they each endorse different views of the explanatory role concept in cog-
nitive science. In Sect. 5, we argue that the reason that eliminativist, pluralist, and 
hybrid theories of concepts endorse different views of the explanatory role concept 
is because they endorse different specifications of the explananda of cognitive sci-
ence. We defend this claim from possible objections in Sect. 6. Then, in Sect. 7, we 
argue that because the explananda of cognitive science cannot be pre-theoretically 
specified, we cannot decide between eliminativist, pluralist, and hybrid interpreta-
tions of the explanatory role of concept. It follows that an explanationist approach 
for determining the natural kind-hood of concept cannot be made to work. We con-
clude by considering what our critique of explanationism could imply for further 
discussions about the explanatory role of concepts in cognitive science.
2  Explanationism About concept
The debate about how best to determine the natural kind-hood of theoretical posits is 
long and convoluted.3 However, one approach that has found favour in recent times 
has been an explanationist approach to natural kind-hood determination. Explana-
tionism holds that “a person’s evidence supports a proposition just in case that prop-
osition is part of the best available explanation for the person’s evidence” (Byerly 
2013). In this way, explanationism dictates that one must assent to the truth of a 
proposition—say, ‘water is H2O ’ or ‘electrons have an intrinsic angular momentum 
(spin) of 1
2
’—iff that proposition is part of the best available explanation for some 
relevant evidence—say, that water has a boiling point of 100◦ or that paramagnetic 
substances (e.g., aluminium and oxygen) are weakly attracted to an applied magnetic 
field. Taken at the level of the truth-conditions alone, explanationism concerns only 
the validity of our beliefs and so appears to have nothing to say about the natural 
3 Much of the debate about theoretical posits has focused on the issue of our epistemic commitment 
to the putative referents of theoretical terms. A number of formal representations of the semantics of 
theoretical terms have been developed, which aim to make explicit the role of such terms in scientific 
theories. Perhaps the most famous of these formal frameworks are Ramsey sentences, which introduce a 
division between the set V
o
 of observational terms and the set V
t
 of theoretical terms in a theory (Ketland 
2004; Ramsey 1931). The framework of Ramsey sentences trades on the idea that theories are syntactic 




) . However, it is also possible to formally 
represent the role of theoretical terms on a semantic conception of theories, albeit then in terms of, e.g., 
partial structures or modal relations (cf. Suppes 1967, 2002; Van Fraassen 1980).
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kind-hood of theoretical posits. However, the explanationist line of argument can be 
taken further in light of the notion that our best explanations are “the only workable 
criterion of reality” (Ellis 2001).
Explanationism can be seen as imposing a condition on the reality of any entity 
posited in scientific explanation, because our commitment to any posit x can be 
assessed in accordance with whether or not x features in a proposition that best 
explains some piece of evidence (Saatsi 2017). When tied to a broadly scientistic 
picture, this kind of explanationism proposes that we should be committed to all 
posits x that feature in propositions that best explain the evidence to be accounted 
for by science. So, on this view, we should be committed to the posits H2O and Elec-
tron, because H2O and Electron feature in at least one proposition that best explains 
some subset of the evidence to be accounted for by science. However, we should not 
be committed to the posit Witches , because Witches does not feature in any proposi-
tion that best explains any evidence to be accounted for by science. Thus, this appli-
cation of explanationism holds that “something is real if its positing plays an indis-
pensable role in the explanation of well-founded phenomena” (Psillos 2005, p. 398). 
In a slogan: some posit x exists iff taking x to exist helps us to formulate scientific 
explanations of something that would otherwise be puzzling (Suppes 2008, p. 16).4
An explanationist approach to natural kind-hood determination purports to iden-
tify those posits that are the best candidates for the kinds that carve reality at its 
joints. So, by applying the explanationist approach to natural kind-hood determina-
tion, we expect to arrive at some principled demarcation of the kinds that are ‘natu-
ral’—say, the kinds gold and electron—and the kinds that are not—say, phlogiston 
and griffin (Kitcher 1993).5 The difficulty, however, is that in order to successfully 
apply the explanationist approach to natural kind-hood determination, we first have 
to specify the evidence that is to be explained. The question of how to specify the 
relevant ‘evidential explananda’ is the root cause of much philosophical wrangling 
about, for instance, the reduction of the special sciences to the fundamental sciences 
or the reality of abstract and/or fictional objects. But putting aside these large and 
cumbersome questions, one thing can be made clear: if we can agree that there are 
some evidential explananda to be explained by science, then it follows that an expla-
nationist approach to natural kind-hood determination ought be able to sort out the 
5 Consider here Bird and Tobin’s (2017) general definition of a natural kind as a kind that “corresponds 
to a grouping that reflects the structure of the natural world rather than the interests and actions of human 
beings”.
4 One may argue that an explanationist approach to natural kind-hood determination is inadequate, 
because best explanations often invoke categories that are not to be thought of as natural kinds, even 
where these categories are useful, causally significant, partially explanatory, etc. This concern, how-
ever, is with the explanationist idea that natural kinds can be somehow read off of our best explanations. 
Although this concern may well be valid, our approach in this paper puts this potential problem with 
explanationism to one side. We accept—for the purposes of our argument—the explanationist claim that 
all posits in our best explanations are natural kinds. However, we question the viability of this expla-
nationist methodology with respect to determining the natural kind-hood of concept. Thus, as we will 
demonstrate below, our argument does not turn on the question of whether or not concept can be thought 
of as natural kind when posited in our best explanations, but, rather, whether or not we can be sure that 
concept will be posited in our best explanations at all.
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natural from non-natural kinds according to which kinds are posited in explanatory 
propositions that best explain the evidential explananda.6
Our concern in this paper is with the evidential explananda of cognitive science. 
We assume, therefore, that there is something for cognitive science to explain. In 
short, we hold that the evidential explananda of cognitive science is any evidential 
explananda that reveals the functioning and operation of cognition or the achieve-
ment or undertaking of cognitive competencies more generally. That is, we assume 
that the evidential explananda of cognitive science are any evidential explananda 
that concern the operations of the mind. With this proviso out of the way, we can 
apply the explanationist approach to natural kind-hood determination to the kinds 
commonly associated with cognitive science. For example, we can apply the expla-
nationist approach to natural kind-hood determination to kinds such as representa-
tion, neuron, or module. What’s more, we can apply the explanationist approach 
to natural kind-hood determination to perhaps the most prominent kind associated 
with cognitive science: the kind concept. An explanationist approach to determin-
ing the natural kind-hood of concept holds that the kind concept is a natural kind if 
and only if there is a proposition featuring concept that is part of the best available 
explanation for some relevant evidence to be explained by cognitive science. For 
example, if the proposition, ‘concept’s are constituents of thought,’ is part of the 
best explanation of some relevant evidence to be explained by cognitive science, 
then we would be justified in supposing that concept is a natural kind. In this way, 
the explanationist approach to determining the natural kind-hood of concept indexes 
the natural kind-hood of concept to concept’s explanatory role in cognitive science.
In recent debates about concepts, an explanationist approach to determining natu-
ral kind-hood of concept has come to fore. For example, both Machery (2009) and 
Weiskopf (2009) endorse an explanationist approach to determining the natural kind-
hood of concept, even if they have not phrased their views in exactly these terms. 
Weiskopf (2009, p. 147) argues that the kind concept—like all other kinds that are 
worthy of our interest—is to be understood as a “groupings of entities that partici-
pate in a body of empirically discovered reliable generalizations, and which partici-
pate in those generalizations due to some set of properties they have in common.” 
Similarly, Machery (2009, p. 232) argues that a class C of entities—for instance, the 
class C that constitutes the kind concept—“is a natural kind if and only if there is a 
large set of scientifically relevant properties such that C is the maximal class whose 
members tend to share these properties because of some causal mechanism”; where 
“scientifically relevant” is to be read as saying that the C is a class about which 
many explanatory generalizations can be formulated (cf. Machery 2009, p. 232, for 
further discussion of Machery’s “Scientific Eliminativism” about natural kinds).7 In 
6 We assume that the explananda of any given science are the phenomena that belong to the subject 
matter of that science. We accept, however, that the question of which science a phenomenon belongs 
to seems to be interconnected with the possibility that a given science has to explain the phenomenon in 
question. We discuss these points in greater detail in Sect. 7 below.
7 It is relevant here to note that Machery endorses a specific characterisation of natural kinds as bor-
rowed from, e.g., (Boyd 1991 ,1999). On this “causal notion of natural kind,” a natural kind is “a class 
about which many generalizations can be formulated,” because “its members tend to have many prop-
erties in common” and “there is at least one causal mechanism that explains why its members tend to 
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the remainder of this paper, we want to build the case against such an explanationist 
approach to determining natural kind-hood of concept.
3  Theories of concept
In the current literature about concepts, there is an ongoing discussion about how to con-
ceive of the explanatory role of the kind concept given the explanatory challenge to the 
received view. In this section, we will use the notation of set theory to elucidate and 
compare the different theories of concept’s explanatory role. Take concept eliminativ-
ism to start with (Machery 2009, 2010). For the eliminativist, there are potentially many 
different representations of one and the same thing. For example, for cats there could 
potentially be a cat-prototype representation, a cat-exemplar representation, and a cat-
theory-like-structure representation. Thus, there could be at least three different tokens 
of mental representations standing for cats; namely pCAT (the cat-prototype), eCAT (the 
cat-exemplar), and tCAT (the cat-theory-like-structure). The kind prototype, for instance, 
can then be described as the set of all prototype tokens, where the defining property of 
this set is the (complex) property P of being a prototype, whatever that might be in detail:
The eliminativist interpretation of the kind concept can then be construed in one of 
two ways: either as the set of all representational kinds with the defining property of 
figuring in scientific explanations of higher order cognitive capacities; or as the set 
of all representations with the complex property CE , where CE is no more than the 
exclusive disjunction of the different defining properties of the explanatorily valu-
able kinds.
or
The first set CONCEPTE1 is simply the set that contains all the different represen-
tational kinds as sets, which are in our example the set of all prototypes, the set of 
all exemplars, and the set of all theory-like structures. The second set CONCEPTE2 
is the set that contains all tokens of the different representational kinds; so, it con-
tains all prototypes (but not the set of all prototypes), all exemplars (but not the 
PROTOTYPE = {x |P(x)} = {pCAT, pDOG,…}
CONCEPTE1 ={x | x figuring in scientific explanations} =
={{x1 |P(x1)}, {x2 |E(x2)}, {x3 |T(x3)}}
CONCEPTE2 ={x |CE(x), where∀y
(
CE(y)↔ (P(y) ∨ E(y) ∨ T(y))
)
} =
={pCAT, eCAT, tCAT, pDOG, eDOG, tDOG,…}
Footnote 7 (continued)
have those properties” (Machery 2009,  pp.  232–233). Moreover, following Boyd, Machery holds that 
a class constituting a natural kind cannot be a subset of a larger class about which the same generalisa-
tions could be formulated, because then the class in question could be subsumed by a larger—and, hence, 
more explanatory—class.
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set of all exemplars), and all theory-like structures (but not the set of all theory-
like structures). PCAT is meant to stand for the cat-prototype, and the idea is that 
all such token prototypes are in CONCEPTE2 as well as all token exemplars and all 
token theory-like structures. In both cases, CONCEPTEx cannot play an additional 
explanatory role in cognitive science: in the first case, because the defining prop-
erty x is nothing more than a property of all the sets that play an explanatory role in 
cognitive science, and so does not play an explanatory role additional to the roles 
already played by its members. In the second case, because the complex property CE 
is no more than the exclusive disjunction of the different defining properties of the 
explanatorily valuable kinds and so does nothing to further explain cognitive capaci-
ties. It follows that eliminativism affords concept no explanatory role, because all of 
the explanatory work is done on the level of representational kinds like prototype, 
exemplar, and theory-like structure (Machery 2009, 2010).
Now consider concept pluralism, which also assumes that there can be different 
kinds of representation for one thing, but that all explanatory representations have 
certain properties in common:
Concept pluralism reacts to the explanatory challenge by arguing that CONCEPTP 
does have an explanatory role, because the defining properties CP of CONCEPTP 
have an explanatory role that cannot be reduced to the explanatory roles of the 
properties P, E, and T. The defining properties CP of CONCEPTP are the functional 
properties of having (i) a logical form that allows for inferential processing; (ii) an 
ability to be combined; (iii) an ability to be acquired; and, finally, (iv) an ability to 
be stored, linked together, and retrieved by a set of memory processes (Weiskopf 
2009, pp. 163–167). All of the representational kinds that are members of the set 
CONCEPTP are taken to possess these functional properties; i.e., the “superordinate 
functional roles” that all members of CONCEPTP share and that are the defining 
properties of CONCEPTP as a set.
According to Weiskopf (2009, p. 167):
the existence of a set of common overarching processes and generalizations 
indicates that these subkinds are a more coherent and systematic object of 
study than their differences might otherwise lead us to think.
Thus, concept pluralism takes the kind CONCEPTP to have a unifying explanatory 
role, because by positing CONCEPTP we are able to explain—by reference to “func-
tionalist considerations”—how the representational kinds posited in cognitive scien-
tific explanation “do not belong to autonomous, disjoint systems”, but rather “con-
stitute different aspects of the human conceptual system” (Weiskopf 2009, p. 170).8 
This unifying role, however, is not played by any of the defining properties P, E, or 
CONCEPTP =
{
x |CP(x) ∶ where∀y
(
(P(y) → CP(y)) ∧ (E(y) → CP(y)) ∧ (T(y) → CP(y))
)}
=
={pCAT, eCAT, tCAT, pDOG, eDOG, tDOG,…}
8 Both concept pluralism and concept eliminativism reject “monolithic theories” of concepts that adhere 
to the singularity and uniformity assumptions (Weiskopf 2009, pp. 149–150). The singularity assumption 
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T of the more fine-grained kinds of mental representations nor can it be reduced to 
them.
Finally, consider concept hybridism. Concept hybridism concurs with concept 
pluralism that the kind concept has an explanatory role to play in cognitive science. 
However, hybridism doubts that prototype, exemplar, and theory-like structure 
constitute disjunctive kinds. Whereas eliminativism and pluralism assume that 
every mental representation falls into exactly one of the three categories, hybridism 
assumes that a single mental representation can fall into two or even three catego-
ries at the same time. Thus, the elements of CONCEPTH do not necessarily possess 
only one of the three properties P, E or T; they may possess all three at the same 
time. Accordingly, CONCEPTH is a set of “integrated representations” that have 
prototype-like, exemplar-like, and theory-like structure-like pieces of information 
as their parts. Thus, the elements of the set denoted by CONCEPTH are not taken 
to be the finer-grained representational kinds prototype, exemplar, and theory-like 
structure, but, rather, are taken to be richly structured representations that have the 
potential to encode all of the pieces of information ordinarily taken to be encoded 
by the disjoint set of representational kinds. In the case of hybridism, therefore, our 
example would read:
As Vicente and Martnez Manrique (2014, p. 61) put it:9
In a nutshell, the idea [of concept hybridism] is that different structures can 
be regarded as constituting a common representation when they are activated 
concurrently, in a way that is functionally significant for the task at hand, and 
in patterns that remain substantially stable along different tasks related to the 
same category.
From the perspective of concept hybridism, the explanatory relevance of the kind 
concept cannot lie in an additional property that mental representations share.10 
CONCEPTH = {x |CH(x)} = {xCAT, xDOG,…}
{x |P(x)}, {x |E(x)}, {x | T(x)} ⊆ CONCEPTH
Footnote 8 (continued)
states that “For any category that can be conceptually represented, there is such a thing as the unique 
concept of that category”; and the uniformity assumption states that “All concepts belong to a single 
psychological kind.”
9 Since some concepts might not have all different kinds of aspects, the set of, say, prototypes might be 
only a subset of the set of concepts.




 might be nothing but the disjunctive property of the 
properties of prototype, exemplar and theory-like-structure, such that ∀x(C
H
(x)↔ (P(x) ∨ E(x) ∨ T(x))) . 




 , therefore, is that the ∨ is to be understood 





 contain very different elements. The first contains mental representations 
that have different functionally integrated aspects; namely, prototype-aspects, exemplar-aspects and theory-
like structural aspects. The second contains prototypes, exemplars, and theory-like structures that have no 
common aspects. Moreover, the inclusive disjunction endorsed by concept hybridism makes it the case that 
while two elements of CONCEPT
H
 need not share a single property, some may share two and some may 
share all three. For example, the concept electron might have only a theory-like structural aspect, while the 
concept dwarf might have only a prototype-aspect. However, it is likely that most representations that are 
the elements of CONCEPT
H
 will have multiple aspects in common.
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Rather, CONCEPTH is relevant to explanation because it makes transparent the inter-
play of different properties or aspects of individual mental representations in cogni-
tive tasks according to patterns of functional integration. Thus, for the hybridist, it 
does not make sense to assume that prototype, exemplar and theory-like-struc-
ture are mutually exclusive kinds with no overlap. Instead, a single representational 
token is posited—as exhibited by the members of CONCEPTH—that possesses all 
of the different properties of the kinds prototype, exemplar, and theory-like-struc-
ture at once without enforcing an internal hierarchy. It follows as a matter of course 
that explanations in cognitive science need not be confined to one specific aspect, 
but can appeal to the different aspects that are functionally integrated in members of 
CONCEPTH . The explanatory role of CONCEPTH is to make this distinction clear.
4  Explanationism About CONCEPT
E,P,H
In this section, we will consider explanationism about the natural kind-hood of con-
cept in the light of the different theories of concept’s explanatory role introduced 
above. Our purpose here is to show that the explanationist approach to determining 
the natural kind-hood of concept stalls, because there is no consensus about what 
explanatory role should be afforded to the kind concept.
4.1  Explanationism About CONCEPT
E
According to our analysis, concept eliminativism can be read in one of two ways: 
either as taking the defining property x of CONCEPTEx to be the property of figur-
ing in scientific explanations of higher order cognitive capacities ( CONCEPTE1 ); or 
as taking the defining property CE of CONCEPTEx to be the property of being a set 
of different explanatorily valuable kinds with (potentially) distinct defining proper-
ties ( CONCEPTE2 ). On either reading, however, concept eliminativism denies that 
CONCEPTEx has an explanatory role in cognitive science. From the perspective of 
the explanationist approach to determining the natural kind-hood of CONCEPTEx , 
therefore, the conclusion is clear: CONCEPTEx is not a natural kind.
To illustrate why this is the case, consider the weird set that contains electron, 
gene, and animal population as members. This set thus contains only kinds posited 
in scientific explanations:
In this toy-example, whilst it may be the case that all of the members of 
the set either have the property of figuring in scientific explanation or 
have some defining properties of their own, it does not follow that the set 
{ELECTRON, GENE, ANIMAL POPULATION} is itself explanatory. Analogously for 
concept eliminativism, whilst it may be the case that prototype, exemplar, theory-
like structure all either have the property of figuring in scientific explanations 
{ELECTRON, GENE, ANIMAL POPULATION}
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or have some defining properties of their own, it does not follow that the defining 
properties CE of the set of these representations—e.g., the set CONCEPTEx—is itself 
explanatory. This holds because prototype, exemplar, and theory-like structure 
are all taken to figure in non-overlapping scientific explanations of different cogni-
tive processes, because their defining properties afford them different explanatory 
roles (cf. Machery 2009, p. 251).11 The eliminativist, therefore, argues that the kind 
CONCEPTEx does not yield to scientific generalisations and so is redundant in cog-
nitive science (cf. Machery 2009, Ch. 8). In other words, because we cannot form 
a proposition that both features CONCEPTEx and is apt to do explanatory work in 
cognitive science—e.g., ‘all representations are a in virtue of being members of 
CONCEPTEx’—, the kind CONCEPTEx cannot be said to have an explanatory role in 
cognitive science.
4.2  Explanationism About CONCEPT
P
In contrast to concept eliminativism, concept pluralism argues that the kind 
CONCEPTP does have an explanatory role to play in cognitive science, because 
the defining properties CP of CONCEPTP are apt for explaining aspects of higher 
cognition that cannot be explained by the defining properties of the members of 
CONCEPTP taken individually. Thus, from the perspective of an explanationist 
approach to determining the natural kind-hood of CONCEPTP the conclusion is 
once again clear: CONCEPTP is a natural kind because it has an explanatory role to 
play in cognitive science, albeit to answer to “top-level [explanatory] demands” that 
“tend to favor unification” (Weiskopf 2009, p. 167).12
To make perspicuous why an explanationist approach to determining the natural 
kind-hood of concept will conclude that CONCEPTP is a natural kind, consider the 
explanatory role that CONCEPTP is afforded in virtue of possessing the defining, 
functional property (i): having a logical form that allows for inferential processing. 
According to concept pluralism, if it can be shown that all representational kinds that 
are member of CONCEPTP have an internal, logical structure, “then it is reasonable 
to suppose that there are mental processes that are sensitive to that structure, rather 
than to the particular concepts that are being combined in that structure” (Weiskopf 
2009, p. 163). By then identifying formal inference processes that generalise over 
different representational kinds—e.g., the inference process that runs from ‘dogs 
are mammals and canines’ to ‘dogs are mammals’ and ‘dogs are canines’—concept 
11 This view is consistent with the claim that prototype, exemplar, and theory-like structure are 
domain-specific representational kinds that are suited to explain only particular domains of higher cog-
nition. And, if this is the right way of thinking, then eliminativism is right to argue that focusing on 
the explanatory role of concept only distracts us from developing more accurate and empirical verified 
explanations of the modular—that is, the encapsulated, dissociable, automatic, neurally localized, and 
centrally inaccessible—operation of components of cognitive systems (Carruthers 2006, p. 62).
12 Consider the explanatory value of the kind mammal, which answers to top-level explanatory demands 
in the same way that, e.g., rodents, ungulates, and primates answer to bottom-level explanatory 
demands.
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pluralists argue that the different representational kinds do, in fact, share the func-
tional property of playing the same syntactic role in inferential thought.
Therefore, the explanatory import of CONCEPTP is justified by concept plural-
ists, because it is only by formulating propositions featuring CONCEPTP—e.g., ‘all 
representations have the same inferential role in thought in virtue of being members 
of CONCEPTP’—that we can explain the inferential nature of thought in general, 
instead of having to formulate as many different explanations of inferential process-
ing as there are representational kinds in the set CONCEPTP . The same reasoning 
applies to concept pluralism’s discussion of the functional properties (ii), (iii), and 
(iv) above. For example, in the case of (iii), concept pluralism argues that modes of 
acquisition are not sensitive to representational subkinds, because the acquisition of 
different representational kinds can involve abstraction over experienced exemplars 
and can involve the use of language and other public representational media. There-
fore, the explanatory import of CONCEPTP is that it makes possible the formula-
tion of propositions—e.g., ‘all representation are acquired in processes involving 
x, y, z in virtue of being members of CONCEPTP’—that explain the acquisition of 
mental states in general, instead of having to formulate as many different explana-
tions of the acquisition of mental states as there are representational kinds in the set 
CONCEPTP . It follows that the kind CONCEPTP has a higher-order explanatory role 
in cognitive science.
4.3  Explanationism About CONCEPT
H
Concept hybridists argue that their theory supports better—that is, more power-
ful—explanations of cognition, because we can explain efficiency and variability in 
cognitive tasks in terms of a switching between the different kinds of information 
encoded by members of the set CONCEPTH . This follows because the members of 
the set CONCEPTH are thought of as being “integrated concepts” instead of as rep-
resentations belonging to only one representational kind P, E, or T. So, from the 
perspective of an explanationist approach to determining the natural kind-hood of 
CONCEPTH , the conclusion is yet again clear: CONCEPTH is a natural kind because 
it is only by formulating explanatory propositions in terms of integrated representa-
tions that we can give the best possible cognitive scientific explanations.
To make this idea explicit, consider the claim by concept hybridists that we 
fare better in explaining categorisation if we presuppose CONCEPTH and so posit 
integrated representation that have prototype-like, exemplar-like, and theory-like 
structure-like parts. According to the hybridist, we fare better in explaining cat-
egorisation because we can appeal to the interrelated and complementary functional 
roles played by the integrated parts of representations in CONCEPTH , depend-
ing on background factors and the task at hand (Vicente and Martnez Manrique 
2014, p.  73). For instance, we can appeal to typicality effects associated with the 
prototype-like part to explain why a four-legged, barking object is categorised 
as a dog; but, equally, we can appeal to essences associated with the theory-like 
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structure-like part to explain why we categorise ‘Bobby’ as a dog after hearing the 
sentence, ‘we left Bobby in the garden to play with his chew-toy.’13 The point, then, 
is that CONCEPTH must have an explanatory role in cognitive science, because 
without CONCEPTH we could not formulate explanatory propositions—e.g., ‘cat-
egorisation involves comparing input with a dog concept, DOGH , across various 
pieces of information’—that best explain the explananda of cognitive science.
In a similar vein, concept hybridists argue that their theory supports better expla-
nations of meaning extraction. In this case, concept hybridists hold that we fare bet-
ter if we posit integrated representations, because we can then provide explanations 
of the linguistic comprehension of lexical items in terms of our switching between 
different pieces of encoded information depending on context (Vicente and Martnez 
Manrique 2014, p. 77). For instance, we can formulate explanations that account for 
the processing of the lexical item ‘dog’ in terms of accessing the single rich concept 
DOGH , even if only some parts of this concept come to be selected. In this way, the 
explanation can appeal to the survey and selection of the best suited information 
for a given task in a given context, because all information is “active and functional 
in meaning extraction,” even if only some pieces are selected for processing to a 
greater or lesser extent (Vicente and Martnez Manrique 2014, p. 81). And, again, 
the fact that such better explanations of meaning extraction are possible only if we 
endorse CONCEPTH is enough for the hybridist to assert that CONCEPTH must 
have an explanatory role in cognitive science.
In sum, eliminativist, pluralist, and hybrid theories of concepts all have differ-
ent conceptions of the kind concept: CONCEPTE , CONCEPTP , and CONCEPTH 
respectively. Moreover, eliminativist, pluralist, and hybrid theories of concept 
all take their conceptions of the kind concept to support the ascription of differ-
ent explanatory roles to concept. And it follows from this state of affairs that each 
theory provides different justifications for why concept either does (pluralism and 
hybridism) or does not (eliminativism) feature in propositions that best explain the 
explananda of cognitive science. As a result, the explanationist approach to deter-
mining the natural kind-hood of concept risks being rendered impotent, because in 
order to decide if concept plays a role in our best cognitive scientific explanations 
we first require a working consensus about which theory of concept to favour.
5  CONCEPT
E,P,H and the Explananda of Cognitive Science
Having now introduced eliminativist, pluralist, and hybrid theories of concept and 
elaborated on their respective conceptions of the explanatory role of the kind con-
cept, one point becomes apparent: that there exists a tension between these theories 
as to whether or not concept has an explanatory role to play in cognitive science 
(eliminativism vs. pluralism/hybridism) and, if it does have an explanatory role, why 
13 In cognitive science, a number of models of categorisation have already been developed that account 
for categorisation effects by appealing to the interplay of more than one kind of representational structure 
(cf. Erickson and Kruschke 1998; Anderson and Betz 2001).
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it has a role to play (pluralism vs. hybridism). Here we want to argue that the reason 
that these two tensions obtain is as a result of eliminativist, pluralist, and hybrid 
theories of concept endorsing different specifications of the explananda of cognitive 
science.
At a superficial level, eliminativist, pluralist, and hybrid theories of concept all 
take cognitive science to have the same explananda: (the operations of) cognition. 
As a result, all three theories seem to accept that the relevant explananda associated 
with the positing of concept are, for instance, the kinds of category judgements and 
inferential processing taking place in the mind. One may suppose, therefore, that 
there is significant overlap between eliminativist, pluralist, and hybrid theories of 
concept with regards to their specifications of the explananda of cognitive science. 
If we dig a little deeper, however, fissures begin to appear in the descriptions of the 
explananda favoured by eliminativist, pluralist, and hybrid theories. For while it may 
be true that each view attempts to best explain particular patterns in the data; each 
view may also suppose that the patterns manifest in the data point to different speci-
fications of what there is to be explained.
Consider the explanandum of category judgements as an illustration of this idea. 
All theories of concept will begin from the same patterns in data; typically, data 
that evidences particular behaviours including, but not limited to, the identification 
and discrimination of objects according to diagnostic features and/or properties. 
For the eliminativist, however, category judgements must come in a diverse num-
ber of kinds. There will be category judgements involving at least the kinds proto-
type, exemplar, and theory-like structure; each different with respect to the salient 
properties identified and processed in any instance of categorising an individual c 
in a category C. It follows, for the eliminativist, that category judgements is not one 
explanandum, but several. Like the eliminativist, the pluralist will accept that cat-
egory judgements come in a diverse number of kinds. For the pluralist, however, 
category judgements will only constitute one explanandum, because any given kind 
of category judgement involving any given kind of representation can be explained 
by our general (and entirely conceptual) ability to categorise. The hybridist concurs 
with the pluralist that there is only one explanandum of category judgements, but 
for different reasons. For the hybridist, the explanandum of category judgements 
does not even divide into a diverse number of different kinds of category judge-
ments involving different representational kinds. This is the case because the hybri-
dist takes all category judgements to involve only one representational kind: inte-
grated and richly structured representations. Thus, the explanandum of category 
judgements is specified in three different ways by eliminativist, pluralist, and hybrid 
theories of concept even where the data to be explained—the evidence of people 
undertaking categorisation tasks—is the same.
The same pattern can be observed in the way eliminativist, pluralist, and hybrid 
theories of concept specify the explananda of inferential processing and the com-
bination of mental representations in response to data evidencing cognitive behav-
iours of, e.g., reasoning and language production. In the case of the explanandum 
of inferential processing, for instance, eliminativists specify that there are as many 
different explananda of inferential processsing as there are representational kinds; 
pluralist specify that even if there are many different kinds of inferential processing, 
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all can be subsumed under the single explanandum of our general (and conceptual) 
ability to inferentially process; and hybridists specify that there is only one kind of 
inferential processing (involving integrated representations) and so there is only one 
explanandum of inferential processing for cognitive science to explain. The same 
is true of their respective specifications of the explanandum of the combination of 
mental representations. Here again, then, we find that eliminativist, pluralist, and 
hybrid theories of concept specify the explananda of cognitive science differently 
even when they agree on the data to be explained.
Moreover, it is not always the case that there is cross-theoretical agreement about 
the data to be explained. An example of this state of affairs is the relevance of chron-
ometric data for cognitive science. The eliminativist, for instance, will likely deny 
that timing in task switching scenarios is an explanandum of cognitive science and 
so will eschew the relevance of chronometric data.14 The reason for this likely denial 
is that chronometric data could speak against an eliminativist position in the follow-
ing way: if chronometric data demonstrate that switching between different kinds 
of concepts is fast and easy—i.e., reliable—, then we would have reason to think 
that there is no additional cognitive mechanism that responds to context-specific 
processes that activate other concepts. For example, if two kinds of concepts are 
needed for the comprehension of a single sentence, such as in “Linda can afford 
to keep Bobby the dog, because chew-toys and dog licence fees are not too expen-
sive,” then hearers should need additional time to activate TDOG related to the dog 
licence fee after having already activated PDOG related to the chew-toy. If not, we 
have good reasons to think that theory-like structural and the prototypical pieces 
of information are functionally coactivated within a single dog-representation. In 
short, then, acknowledging chronometric data in cognitive science would ipso facto 
be an acknowledgement of the possibility of deciding if there are some processes 
that simultaneously involve—and, hence, unify—the objects grouped into the kind 
concept.
Of course, another possibility is that the eliminativist merely overlooks such 
chronometric data, but is ready to concede their relevance. In this case, the data 
would turn into empirical counter-evidence to eliminativism. Still another possibility 
is to find another explanation of such chronometric data that is consistent with elimi-
nativism. Our purpose in discussing chronometric data is not to deny these possibili-
ties, but rather to provide an example of how the interaction between a theory and 
its explananda could influence the interpretation of the data favoured. To make this 
point concrete, consider first the explananda of working memory. Prima facie, the 
data regarding working memory limitation seems to be shared by all cognitive sci-
entists. However, we find competing explanations of working memory limitations. 
14 One will certainly not find any explicit rejection of the relevance of chronometric data in the writings 
of eliminativists such as Machery, but this is unsurprising. To mention such data would be to concede 
that such data is relevant for cognitive science, which serves only to undermine the eliminativist’s posi-
tion with respect to competing theories of concept. So even though the existence of chronometric data 
does not depend on the theory of concept one adopts, one’s conception of what cognitive science aims 
to explain can cause such data to be irrelevant. In this sense, the data in question become “invisible” as 
explananda.
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Miller (1956), for instance, argued that the capacity of working memory is 7 ± 2 
objects (or chunks of information). Later, however, Baddeley (1992) proposed a 
more detailed account of working memory with different sub-systems; among them 
the “phonological loop” of about 2 s, the average time needed to speak about seven 
words in English (see also Baddeley 1996). This difference in the description of the 
explananda of working memory has further implications for the evaluation of each 
theory: while an information-theoretic approach measuring amounts of information 
is the obvious choice for Miller, such accounts could not explain the phenomenon 
as described by Baddeley; within Baddeley’s model, explanations based on the 
articulatory apparatus are much more promising.15 The upshot is that the data to be 
explained—e.g., data regarding learned responses to stimuli—are interpreted differ-
ently by the two theories: one takes it as evidence for limitations on the storage of 
chunks of information; the other as evidence for limitation on the storage of auditory 
memory traces.
Another example concerns our capacity to reason with conditionals as tested in 
the famous Wason Selection Task (Wason 1968; Wason and Shapiro 1971). If the 
conditional rule that is to be tested is formulated in an abstract way (e.g., “if there 
is a vowel on the one side of a card, there is an even number on the other side”), 
subjects perform poorly when compared to the solution that is correct according to 
standard sentential logic of the if-then-operator interpreted as material implication. 
However, if the rule is more concrete (e.g., “if a person is drinking alcohol, he must 
be older than 21 years”), the accuracy of subjects’ reasoning improves dramatically. 
This is sometimes referred to as the “content effect.” Given this data, one possibility 
is to describe the explanandum of cognitive science as the capacity of conditional 
reasoning, which is modulated by another factor; namely, the content of the rule. 
Another possibility—taken by, e.g., Cosmides and Tooby (1992)—is to deny that 
there is such a thing as the capacity of conditional reasoning at all, but only a capac-
ity to deal with social rules. Thus, even though both would agree that data about the 
“content effect” is something that has to be taken into account in the explanation of 
the phenomena, they still interpret that same data in different ways: one takes it as 
evidence for the interaction of the capacity of conditional reasoning with some other 
aspect of cognition; that other takes it as evidence that the capacity of conditional 
reasoning should be eschewed altogether as an explanandum of cognitive science.
The problem, therefore, is that cross-theoretical agreement about the data (or the 
description of the data) to be explained is not always apparent. In the context of our 
discussion about theories of concept, the eliminativist will likely reject any inter-
pretations of chronometric data that makes such data relevant for cognitive science. 
This can be seen as analogous to Baddeley’s (1992) refusal to interpret the data 
as showing that people remember a certain amount of information; and Cosmides 
and Tooby’s (1992) refusal to interpret that data as evidence for a general capac-
ity of conditional reasoning that is modulated by other factors. And where there is 
no cross-theoretical agreement about the data to be explained or how to describe 
15 This example is only meant to be illustrative. Our intention, therefore, is not to evaluate the two theo-
ries or to decide between them.
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them, we find ourselves at a loss when it comes to evaluating which of the available 
explanations is the best. This is also true in the context of the dispute between elimi-
nativist, pluralist, and hybrid theories of concept. For instance, if one thinks that 
the explanandum of category judgements ought appeal to only one representational 
kind, then one has good reason for endorsing CONCEPTH . But if one thinks that the 
explanandum of category judgements ought appeal to many representational kinds, 
then one has good reason for endorsing either CONCEPTE or CONCEPTP ; depend-
ing, that is, on one’s views about the superordinate unity of those kinds. Thus, we 
find that one’s view on the explananda of cognitive science—and, hence, on the 
interpretation and (ir)relevance of certain bodies of data (or their description)—bias 
one towards a certain theory of concept and towards a certain view of concept’s 
explanatory role.
6  Capacities and Effects
Now, one may think that our conclusion in the previous section is too quick, 
because we ourselves have not provided a specification of the explananda of cog-
nitive science. Plausibly, then, one may think that it is at least possible to specify 
the explananda of cognitive science in such a way that would undermine the appar-
ent disagreements between eliminativist, pluralist, and hybrid theories of concept. 
For example, one may think it is possible to follow Cummins (2000,  p.  120) and 
argue that the explananda of cognitive science should be divided into primary and 
undiscovered capacities—e.g., “to see depth, to learn and speak a language, to plan, 
to predict the future, to empathize, to fathom the mental states of others” (Cum-
mins 2000,  pp.  124–125)—and secondary and discovered effects—e.g., well con-
firmed regularities that can be specified as laws in situ that “restate the phenomenon 
in more general terms” (Cummins 2000, p. 120).16 Working from this premise, one 
could argue that:
the explanation of incidental effects [...] have little interest in their own right: 
no one would construct a theory just to explain them. But their success-
ful explanation can often be crucial to the assessment of theories or models 
designed to explain the core capacities that are the primary targets of psycho-
logical inquiry (Cummins 2000, p. 128).
Accordingly, one could submit the following counter-argument to our claim: the 
disagreement between eliminativist, pluralist, and hybrid theories of concept is 
about the effects identified by cognitive science and not about the capacities that 
cognitive science aims to explain. If this counter-argument were right, then the dis-
pute between these theories would not be about the explananda of cognitive science 
tout court, but would be about fine-grained explanatory issues found at the level of 
16 A good example of an effect would be the McGurk effect, which can be paraphrased as a law that 
states that one will have the illusion of hearing a particular sound when the auditory component of 
another sound is paired with the visual component of yet another sound.
1 3
The Explanatory Role of Concepts 
effects; for instance, the speed of categorisation and shifts in categorisation when 
different aspects of the stimuli are emphasised (Ahn and Kim 2000; Ahn and Den-
nis 2001). In Cummins’ terms, the dispute would be about “what happens” and not 
“why or how”; and this would lead us to be more optimistic about finding a specifi-
cation of the explananda that could be shared by all theories of concept.
This counter-argument, however, fails to appreciate the difficulty in differentiat-
ing between capacities and effects when we factor in the contradictory viewpoints 
endorsed by the different theories of concept. For it is clear that specifying the 
explananda of cognitive science in terms of both capacities and effects is highly non-
trivial. Cummins (2000, p. 127) himself states that “it can be a matter of substantive 
controversy whether we are looking at an exercise of a capacity or an incidental 
effect.” This controversy is heightened in the case of the debate between different 
theories of concept, because the question of how to draw the line between capacities 
and effects cannot be conveniently segregated from a deeper question about what 
the capacities are in the first place.17 For example, one could argue—in accord with 
the pluralist—that differences in categorisation judgements involving different kinds 
of representations are merely effects incidental to the exercise of a single capacity 
to categorise. But, equally, one could take the eliminativist view that there are as 
many different capacities to categorise as there are representational kinds operative 
in cognition. And this highlights an important point; namely, that there will be no 
agreement between eliminativists, pluralists, and hybridists about how to enact a 
functional analysis that delivers a demarcation between capacities and effects. And 
thus there will be no agreement about which explanations best explain either capaci-
ties or effects, or about the structure of the system giving rise to both capacities and 
effects.18
The same point can be made against those who argue that we do not consider in 
enough detail the explanatory targets of working cognitive scientists. For example, 
those who insist that working cognitive scientists could never get on board with con-
cept eliminativism, because the kind concept is to them an indispensable explana-
tory tool. Keil (2010,  p.  Keil), for instance, argues that there will be “a strong 
tendency to resist” the claim that there are “an indefinitely large number” of repre-
sentations operative in cognition (e.g., pDOG, eDOG, tDOG, pCAT, eCAT, tCAT… ). Under-
lying this claim is the worry articulated by Hampton (Hampton 2010, p. 212) that:
the term “concept” is needed as part of an account of the many situations in 
which PET systems [(e.g., prototypes, exemplars, and theory-like structures 
representations)] interact. How does one discuss concept combination, includ-
ing the formation of composite prototypes, the importing of exemplar knowl-
edge, and the coherence checking of the result through background theory, if 
one cannot have the integrative term “concept” to specify just what it is that is 
17 This point connects to our discussion of the putative capacities of working memory and conditional 
reasoning in the previous section.
18 Note that we do not want to take a stand on how we should specify the explananda of cognition. 
Rather, we only want to show that different specifications are possible but will be mutually contradictory. 
This, in turn, problematises the appeal to cognitive science by theories of concept.
 S. D. Taylor, G. Vosgerau 
1 3
being combined. The combination occurs at the concept level, and the descrip-
tion of the processes involved then requires elaboration in terms of the PET 
systems.
The counter-argument, therefore, is that given the state of cognitive scientific 
research there are some explananda—e.g., explananda that require cross-represen-
tational processing such as “concept combination”—that demand that concept be 
afforded an explanatory role in cognitive science. The problem, however, is that one 
need not endorse the claim that putative explananda involving cross-representational 
processing are part of the explanatory remit of cognitive science. Instead, one may 
think that the composition of prototypes is distinct from the composition of exem-
plars and theory-like structures; the use of exemplar knowledge is distinct from 
the use of prototype and theory-like structure knowledge; and that coherence 
checking is limited to one representation kind at a time. Thus, in terms of Cummins’ 
distinction, one may hold that the capacities associated with each kind of representa-
tion are distinct and that the specification of an effect of cross-representational pro-
cessing fails to pick out a regular behavioural patterns characteristic of the structure 
of cognition. This strictly modular view of cognitive structure may strike some as 
unappealing, but it will dovetail with the specification of the explananda favoured by 
the eliminativist and with the eliminativist’s view on concept’s explanatory role.19
The upshot is that the appeal to the working explanatory interests of cognitive 
scientists underdetermines the specification of the explananda. For while it is true 
that many cognitive scientists have been willing to characterise behavioural patterns 
as characteristic of a particular kind of structure responsible for cross-representa-
tional processing, it is also true that all cognitive scientists need not characterise 
the same behavioural patterns in the same way. For instance, one may characterise 
an infant’s switch from prototype-based categorisation judgements to theory-like 
structure-based categorisation judgements in terms of a kind of structure respon-
sible for cross-representational processing (Keil 1989). But, equally, one may char-
acterise the same switch as a binary change in the operation of two, distinct capaci-
ties: the capacity to categorise using prototypes and the capacity to categorise using 
theory-like structures. The point, then, is that one cannot assume ex ante what the 
capacity or capacities for conceptual change consists in, because it is possible that 
the switch in development from categorising with prototypes to categorising with 
theory-like structures is a mere incidental effect. Our argument is that the view 
one takes on these matters will cohere with the theory of concept and of concept’s 
explanatory role one favours.
19 It is worth making explicit at this point that we do not want to argue that there are no reasons to accept 
one or another theory of concept. Of course, one could find any number of reasons; for example, reasons 
concerned with putative theoretical virtues such as beauty, simplicity, and coherency (cf. Keas 2018, for 
a good summary of such virtues); or sociological reasons concerned with one’s experience with and pref-
erence for distinct explanatory tools or one’s institutional embedding. Our only argument, then, is that 
the explanatory success of theoretical terms like concept cannot be determined independent of a theory, 
and thus there is no out-of-theory reason to accept this or that ontological claim about the existence of 
such things as concepts.
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To sum up, we do not argue that a unification of cognitive science is, in principle, 
impossible. Rather, we argue that we do not currently have a unified specification of 
what cognitive science aims to explain, as evidenced by the fact that different theo-
ries of concept take cognitive science to be targeting different explananda. Although 
it is clear that are overlaps in what different theories of concept take cognitive sci-
ence to be in the business of explaining, there is also enough disagreement to under-
mine the search for a definitive account of concept’s explanatory role. Thus, to make 
progress in this regard we would first have to arrive at a unified specification of the 
explananda of cognitive science. In the next section, however, we will argue that 
the presence of the divergent theories of concept makes it doubtful that any uni-
fied specification could be attained, which serves to undermine the explanationist 
approach to determining the natural kind-hood of concept.
7  concept, Explananda, and Explanationism
In Sect.  4, we argued that eliminativist, pluralist, and hybrid theories of concept 
disagree about the explanatory role of concept in virtue of endorsing three different 
interpretations of the concept of concept; that is, in virtue of endorsing CONCEPTE , 
CONCEPTP , and CONCEPTH respectively. And in section five and six, we argued 
that the tension between eliminativist, pluralist, and hybrid theories of concept is 
due to each theory endorsing different specifications of the explananda of cognitive 
science. The remaining question, however, is how this undermines an explanationist 
approach to determining the natural kind-hood of concept.
Even given what we have said above, an advocate of an explanationist approach to 
natural kind-hood determination may hold that the natural kind-hood of CONCEPT 
can be determined by evaluating whether or not it participates in the best cognitive 
scientific explanations—it is just that we do not know what these explanations are yet 
or, crucially, what these explanations purport to explain. As we have argued above, 
however, the tension between the three theories about the explanatory role of concept 
arises from different interpretations of what the best explanations of cognitive sci-
ence set out to explain.20 Therefore, we contend that in order for the explanationist 
approach to determining the natural kind-hood of concept to be viable, we must first 
decide what the explananda of cognitive science are; which—according to our argu-
ment—amounts to the same thing as deciding between eliminativist, pluralist, and 
hybrid theories of concept. Thus, there is circle built into explanationism that pre-
vents it from being a viable method to determine whether concept is a natural kind.
In principle, we can always disagree about the best cognitive scientific explana-
tions for a given explanandum. However, as we demonstrated in Sects. 5 and 6, the 
dispute between eliminativist, pluralist, and hybrid theories of concept is at an even 
deeper level, for they do not even agree about the explananda to be explained by 
20 Note that all three theories aim to account for why cognitive science does or does not need to employ 
concept in explanation; and since we do not have reason to assume that they speak about three different 
cognitive sciences, there must be some reason for their divergent perspectives in this regard.
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cognitive science in the first place. For example, in one case the kind CONCEPTP 
is taken to explain the unity of all category judgements (concept pluralism); but, in 
another case, the kind CONCEPTE is taken to explain nothing at all such that the 
unity of all category judgements is explicitly rejected. In this way, one theory cites 
explananda that are not cited or even countenanced by the other. Thus, we cannot 
even say that in all cases one theory of concept rejects the cognitive scientific expla-
nations favoured by another as bad or superfluous explanations. Instead, we must say 
that in at least some cases one theory rejects the interpretation of cognitive scientific 
explanations favoured by another as bad or superfluous interpretations. The point, 
then, is that because eliminativist, pluralist, and hybrid theories of concept do not 
agree on the explananda for which we seek cognitive scientific explanations, they 
cannot agree on what counts as the best cognitive scientific explanations.
It is clear that all sciences must begin with a specification of their explananda. For 
example, the phenomenon of lightning was specified as an explanandum of physics, and 
consequently physics has formulated an explanation for this phenomenon. But we must 
also keep in mind that the possibility of progress depends upon there being better specifi-
cations of the explananda, which serve to restrict the number of acceptable explanations 
that the science can formulate. It follows that the act of specifying the explananda of a 
certain science is not independent of the progress of that science—in fact, the progress of 
a science feeds into a process by which better specifications of the explananda are made 
and new explananda are brought into the purview of explanation.21 For sure, it is not an 
easy question why certain phenomena belong to the subject matter of a certain science. 
Moreover, during the development of a science, the range of phenomena belonging to 
the subject matter of this science is liable to change. Not only are new phenomena iden-
tified (e.g., quantum effects), but known phenomena might ‘change sides’ (e.g., some 
‘chemical’ facts about the reactivity of substances turned out to be better explainable by 
atomic physics). We are thus confronted with a situation that is sometimes called a “vir-
tuous circle,” where the explanatory goals of a science (its explananda) and the explana-
tions that the science provides are mutually constitutive. Schematically:
1. The explananda of a science are (partly) determined by specifying them.
2. The terms used to specify the explananda are determined by the theory (i.e., they 
are theoretical terms).
3. As the theory develops, new explanations are found.
4. As new explanations are found, new terms are introduced and existing terms are 
refined.
5. With new and refined terms, the explananda of the science change.22
21 It is clear that a science evolves and develops as it tries to improve upon its best current explana-
tions. So-called “theoretical terms” are introduced into science for the very reason of making something 
explainable (i.e., by abduction or inference to the best explanation). By parsing scientific theories in 
terms of, e.g., Ramsey-sentences or partial structures, such terms and their defining place within a theory 
can be made explicit (cf. Andreas 2017; Lewis 1970; Van Fraassen 1980).
22 To be sure: the phenomena to be explained do not change, but their descriptions do, which essentially 
involve scientific terms. Since the explananda (as understood here) are not the phenomena themselves 
but the specific descriptions of the phenomena, the explananda change. E.g., the explanandum of why all 
objects fall with the same speed in a vacuum was not available before Galileo.
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In the current debate about the natural kind-hood of concept, a positive por-
trayal of the virtuous circle has been presupposed, where explananda-specification 
takes us first to viable explanations, then we move from viable explanations to 
refined specifications of the explananda, and finally from refined specifications of 
the explananda back again to better explanations. On this picture, the explanation-
ist approach to determining the natural kind-hood of concept can seem to make 
some sense: concept is a natural kind only insofar as it features in the better expla-
nations arrived at following the interchange between explananda-specification and 
cognitive scientific explanation. This view, however, is brought into question when 
we recognise that any answer to the question of what constitutes a ‘better’ cog-
nitive scientific explanations must presuppose an answer to the question of what 
explananda are to be explained by cognitive science in the first place. Thus, we are 
forced to accept that a specification of the explananda of cognitive science is never 
theoretically innocent, because it serves to constrain the process of formulating 
‘better’ explanantions and ‘better’ explananda-specifications further down the line. 
It follows that one’s view of what counts as the best explanation will be influenced 
by one’s view of the explananda in need of explanation.
To decide between theories of concept, it seems therefore that we would first 
have to find a way to settle the explananda of cognitive science. But this cannot be 
easily achieved. To illustrate this point, consider the following two explananda: (a) 
a stick half under water that looks bent even though it is not; and (b) two lines of the 
same length, one with inward pointing arrow heads, the other with outward point-
ing arrow heads, which look like they are of different length even though they are 
not (the “Müller–Lyer–Illusion”). The first explanandum is one of optics, the second 
is one of psychology of perception. Accordingly, the first is easily explained by the 
laws of optics, whereas the second is not; to explain the second phenomenon, we 
need to appeal to basic psychological principles of perception that are not related to 
the laws of optics. However, why (a) and (b) belong to the subject matter of different 
disciplines is not prima facie obvious, and we doubt that there could be a specifica-
tion of the explananda that would make the difference clear, unless that specifica-
tion already presupposes the difference between optics and psychology. For exam-
ple, one could try to specify that (a) is an explanandum belonging to the subject 
matter of optics and (b) an explanandum belonging to psychology by arguing that 
everything in front of the retina is optics; and since (the image of) the stick is bent 
on the retina but (the images of) the two lines are not of different sizes on the retina, 
the first would be specified as an optical phenomenon and the second not. However, 
this specification already presupposes that optics is confined to certain visual phe-
nomena and psychology to the processing of visual phenomena, which presupposes 
a certain understanding of the disciplines and their subject matter, which then biases 
our specifications of the explanandum itself.23
23 One can see clearly here how finding better specifications of the explananda is part of the remit of sci-
ence. For example, as soon as the the “Müller–Lyer–Illusion” is identified as a psychological explanan-
dum, psychology will find better specifications of the phenomenon giving rise to the explanandum; that 
is, that it is a phenomenon made manifest by a default heuristic in the visual system that processes the 
configuration of angled lines so as to optimise judgements about depth and distance (Gregory 1966).
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As with our example of the specification of explananda (a) and (b), eliminativist, 
pluralist, and hybrid theories of concept endorse specifications of the explananda of 
cognitive science that dovetail with their understanding of the discipline and its subject 
matter. This point has been made at length in Sect. 5. With this in mind, we can draw 
one final conclusion for our discussion of the different theories of concept: we cannot 
decide which specification of the explananda of cognitive science to endorse by simply 
looking at the kinds of explanations formulated in cognitive science. The reason for 
this state of affairs is because every specification of the explananda will be validated by 
those explanations that are taken to explain the explananda specified. That is, by those 
explanations that can be interpreted as explaining, say, the unity of cognitive systems 
(concept pluralism), the modularity of cognitive systems (concept eliminativism), or 
the functional integration of the representations operative in cognitive systems (con-
cept hybridism). And this bias runs both ways, because no comparison of cognitive sci-
entific explanations will be possible where there is disagreement about what it is that 
cognitive science ought to be in the business of explaining. We thus seem to lose the 
basis for a comparison of theories of concept that is not ad hoc, since different theories 
presuppose different specifications of the explananda of cognitive science, and so each 
has reasons to find different cognitive scientific explanations more or less successful.24 
If we couple this argument with our claim in Sects. 3 and 4 that different theories of 
concept afford concept different explanatory roles, then it is evident that an explana-
tionist approach to determining the natural kind-hood of concept cannot be made to 
work. This follows because we cannot hope to decide between the different theories of 
concept’s explanatory role (e.g., CONCEPTEx , CONCEPTP , and CONCEPTH respec-
tively) when we cannot even agree about what cognitive science aims to explain.25
8  Outlook for Discussions About concept
Our conclusion, if correct, appears to leave the naturalistically-inclined philosopher 
of cognitive science in a difficult spot. For it seems that the explanations formu-
lated in cognitive science can no longer be taken as a reliable guide to the natural 
24 Our argument here has certain parallels with the idea of “experimenter’s regress” put forward by 
Collins (1981) and Collins (1992) in his discussion of Joseph Weber’s apparatus for gravitational wave 
detection. According to Collins, there is a circle between judgements of the validity of a measurement 
device and judgement of the validity of a measurement result. More specifically, he argues that “we 
don’t know if we have built a good detector until we have tried it and obtained the correct outcome! 
But we don’t know what the correct outcome is until...and so on ad infinitum” (Collins 1992,  p.  84). 
Thus, a regress obtains when “scientists try to justify their judgements about a given outcome or about 
the quality of their data” (Feest 2016, p. 35). We accept that our claim that there is no way to compare 
explananda across theoretical contexts is analogous to Collins’ claim that there is no way to adjudicate 
disagreements over whether a particular empirical test has captured a certain phenomenon. However, we 
will set aside further discussion of the relation between the two positions—and of the viability of Col-
lins’ claims (cf. Franklin 1999, for criticism of Collins’ position)—due to lack of space.
25 To prevent misunderstanding: our argument does not exclude a future specification of the explananda 
of cognitive science that incorporates all the different explananda of eliminativism, pluralism, and 
hybridism, and so is able to offer a unified account with respect to these three theories of concept. How-
ever, this new overarching specification of the explananda would be just another specification, possibly 
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kind-hood of concept. One may suppose, therefore, that the kind concept—and per-
haps other similar kinds featuring in cognitive scientific explanation—cannot be said 
to be natural kinds at all. This line of reasoning, however, is much too quick. For 
whilst it may be true that the kind concept ought be thought of as a mind-dependent, 
social kind in Hacking’s (1995; 1999) sense; it does not follow that concept cannot 
also be a natural kind (Hacking 1995, 1999; Khalidi 2009). This is the case because 
even if the classification of concept is interactive and can change in response to our 
attitudes towards cognitive scientific explanations, this does not make the concept 
ontologically subjective. The crucial point here has been put clearly by Khalidi 
(2015) as follows:
Mind-dependence is a red herring when it comes to ontological objectivity. There 
are various phenomena that depend on the human mind (both causally and con-
stitutively) yet are not non-real, at least not in the same sense as fictional entities. 
Still, isn’t there a sense in which all social kinds are ontologically subjective, as 
Searle claims? Doesn’t the fact that they would not have existed without the exist-
ence of human minds render them ontologically different from other kinds? Some 
perspective on these questions may be gained by reflecting further on the analogy 
between mind and life. Consider biological kinds like tiger, larva, and metabo-
lism. It is safe to say that these biological kinds are life-dependent, in the sense 
that they would not have existed without life. But that does not seem to impugn 
their ontological objectivity, and nor should the mind-dependence of social (and 
psychological) kinds (Khalidi 2015, 111).
The central message of this paper, then, is not that concept is not a natural kind. 
Rather, we hope to have shown that any approach to determining the natural kind-hood 
of concept must pay attention to the mind-dependence of the kind concept as a tool 
in the ongoing, non-monotonic practice of explanation-giving and explananda-speci-
fication in cognitive science. The explanationist approach to determining the natural 
kind-hood of concept fails to recognise this point, because even where explanation-
ism accepts the plasticity of explanations and explanatory methods, it must assume that 
the best explanations—and, hence, the ‘correct’ specifications of the explananda—can 
always be agreed upon (Poston 2016). But since there are no theory-neutral standards 
of epistemic justification by which to compare explanations and explananda-specifica-
tion, this assumption is misguided (Appley and Stoutenburg 2017; Stoutenburg 2015). 
As a result, there can be no straightforward explanationist determination of the natural 
kind-hood of concept.
Having made this point, we need not go as far as to say that discussion of concept’s 
natural kind-hood should be divorced from cognitive science altogether. We must, 
however, pay attention to the fact that progress is only possible when there is the pos-
sibility of tractable disagreement about the best cognitive scientific explanations and 
Footnote 25 (continued)
rivalling a second future specification, which could then go on to rival a third future specification, and so 
on ad infinitum. So, our argument in this paper would apply equally to all such hypothetical future speci-
fication of the explananda of cognitive science.
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explananda-specifications. In this way, we must recognise that the results of cognitive 
science can only come to bear on discussions about the natural kind-hood of concept 
when we are able, in principle, to come to an agreement about what constitutes the 
best cognitive scientific explanations and explananda-specifications. We are not con-
vinced that any such agreement is possible. But, if it is, then it is most likely to be 
found in the case of those explanations that account for explananda specified in accord-
ance with our shared, pre-theoretic understanding of the world; that is, the sui generis 
explananda specified by attending to our common experiences. If there could be a set of 
best explanations of these explananda, then we could implement a revised explanation-
ist approach to natural kind-hood determination, whereby we determine natural kind-
hood by identifying those kinds that play a role in explanations that best explain pre-
reflectively specified explanada. But the promise of using such a revised explanationist 
approach to determine the natural kind-hood of concept depends, counter-intuitively, 
on a pre-theoretic specification of what there is for cognitive science to explain.
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